Is determinism completely rejected in the standard Quantum Mechanics? by Bahreini, J. et al.
An Analytical and Philosophical Investigation of the Concept of Determinism in 
Physics 
 
J. Bahreini 
(1)
, M. Monfared 
(2)
, and H. Razmi 
(3)
 
 
(1), (2) Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Qom, Qom, I. R. Iran. 
(3) Department of Physics, University of Qom, Qom, I. R. Iran 
(1) jf.bah1400@gmail.com; (2) Mmonfared86@gmail.com; (3) razmi@qom.ac.ir 
 
Abstract 
It has been several thousand years since the birth of the concept of determinism. This concept is related to 
other fundamental concepts such as causality, prediction, and even notions such as law, will, and 
intelligence. Concept of determinism has had many transformations throughout the history of physics, and it 
has been so influential in this field. However, with the growth of quantum physics, determinism became a 
scientific "dilemma" and has created many challenges in various contemporary sciences. If this concept is 
understood correctly, many misconceptions corresponding to it in natural sciences, especially physics can be 
removed. It seems the root of the problems associated with "determinism" refers to its conceptual ambiguity.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate this concept analytically to solve the existing problems. To do this, 
first we consider the terminology of determinism including characteristic, necessary connection, and exact 
prediction. Then, William James definition of determinism, Laplacian determinism, Popper definition of 
determinism, causal determinism, logical determinism, epistemic determinism, metaphysical determinism, 
and theological determinism are introduced. After which, we pay attention to different kinds of determinism 
including global/local domain, complete/incomplete form, and the main factor in the formation of events. In 
the next step, the evolution of the concept of determinism in physics is explained. It is found that although 
determinism had been vague and causal in ancient Greece, it has become global and theological in middle 
Ages. In classical physics, it took a complete and universal form. Laplace provided the most complete 
picture of determinism. Because of some philosophical ideas, determinism changed into a different concept 
in quantum mechanics. Copenhagen school physicists, especially Bohr, regarded "determinism" as a 
problem and an undesirable element. Finally, we design a new framework to analyze the concept of 
determinism and try to solve the dilemma of determinism through this framework. At the heart of this 
framework lies the notion that "determinism" is not a simple concept; rather, it is a complex scientific 
subject with a number of aspects and characteristics. Prediction, the world accessibility, and connection 
between the past and the future are the characteristics of the concept of determinism. These features cannot 
be set aside from the science. The final result is that determinism cannot be denied in the science; in 
particular, the quantum mechanics is a deterministic theory but in an incomplete or local manner. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of determinism was created a few thousand years ago in ancient Greece. This concept appeared 
in the ancient Greek philosophy to interpret nature. By eliminating the gods, determinism was used to 
describe nature (Guthrie, 1962: 43). Later, it was most clearly postulated by antique atomism. In the epoch 
of modern history, most of the natural sciences and materialist philosophy substantiated and developed 
determinism (by F. Bacon, Galileo Galilee, Descartes, Newton, Lomonosov, Laplace, Spinoza, and the 
French 18th-century materialists) (Frolov, 1984: 104). They believed that "determinism is necessarily 
mechanistic and abstract"(Frolov, 1984: 104). This opinion conforms to a level of conception used in the 
contemporary natural science. By the strictly dynamic laws of mechanics, causality received a new form 
which was absolute and governed. Therefore, the scholars of that era combined causality and necessity, and 
denied the objective character of chance. In the twentieth century, physicists rejected the continuity, the 
causality of the classical mechanics, and the possibility of representation, which was changed by motions in 
time and space. Later, the philosophical implications of physics underwent a great deal of change and new 
perspectives were formed. Both in physics and philosophy, the mechanical age had expired. Determinism 
was so influential in modern physics, as they regarded the birth of "modern physics" to be the result of the 
abandonment of determinism (Jeans, 1943: 125). With the growth of quantum physics, Determinism became 
a scientific dilemma. The physicist's solution was the complete elimination of determinism, not only from 
the domain of radioactivity, but from the whole realm of physics (Jeans, 1943: 151). 
It is noteworthy that the concept of determinism is discussed today in many sciences, such as metaphysics, 
epistemology, biology, sociology, physics, and ethics (Sarkar, Pfeifer, 2006: 198) and Even in theology 
(Popper, 1991: 5). This concept is related to other fundamental concepts such as causality, prediction, and 
even notions such as law, free will, intelligence, and chance (Carnap, 1966: 218).  
The concept of determinism has created many challenges in various contemporary sciences. Although some 
insist that determinism is a dead issue, it is a robust doctrine and is quite hard to kill. Nonetheless, it is 
fragile in other respects and requires various enabling assumptions to give it a fighting chance (Butterfield, 
Earman, 2007: 1369).  
According to our opinion, the root of the determinism problems is the conceptual ambiguity of this notion. It 
causes a lot of scientific misunderstanding. If we understand the concept of determinism correctly, we can 
eliminate the misunderstandings in many natural sciences, especially physics. Therefore, this article aims at 
identifying this concept analytically and philosophically in order to solve many of these misconceptions. 
To solve the ambiguity of determinism, we first discuss the terminology of determinism and its definitions. 
Then, the types of determinism and the evolution of determinism are investigated. Finally, we try solve the 
dilemma of determinism in modern physics. 
 
2. Terminology 
 
Determinism has various terms and applications. Therefore, it has brought about a bewildering confusion 
prevailing in the contemporary scientific and philosophic literature with regard to these existing meanings 
(Bunge, 1979: 6). Therefore, it is necessary to carefully examine its various meanings. 
The word determination has been expressed through various concepts in actual use, among which the 
following cases are particularly conforming to our discussion. 
(a) Property or characteristic: 'determination' is equivalent to the term "characteristic", either qualitative or 
quantitative. In post-Roman latin, determinatio meant that, and this way it came to be used in various 
European languages, notably in German (Determination and Bestimmung). 
Thus, if something has definite characteristics and can consequently be characterized unambiguously, then it 
is determinate. I other words, the term 'determinate' is used as an equivalent of precise or definite, in 
contradistinction to vague. Because of this, Locke applied the ideas "determinate" or "determined", which 
Descartes had described as clear and distinct; and Claude Bernard termed 'indetermines' the facts prepared 
without precision: those ill-defined facts "constituting real obstacles to science" (Bunge, 1979: 6).  
 
(b) Necessary connection: if there is a constant and unique connection among things or events, or among 
states or qualities of things, as well as among ideal objects, then there is determinism. This meaning is the 
most frequent use of the word 'determination' in science (for instance, machines that run regular and 
reproducible - hence fully predictable - courses have been called determinate). It is necessary to note that 
constant unique connections need not be causal, because it is possible to have constant unique connections 
among things that are always together, without one of them being cause and the other being effect (Bunge, 
1979: 6). 
(c) Exact prediction (general determinism): if we can predict anything in the future, it is in fact 
determined in the past. It is not necessary to assume a causal relationship for an "exact prediction", because 
the prediction of the future is done by God or is possible accidently. However we determine the future. So, 
even the chance which at first sight is alien to determinism has its especial laws, and can be gathered with 
prediction; consequently, chance has a place in "general determinism" (Bunge, 1979: 13). 
 
3. Definitions 
 
After providing the lexical meanings of determinism, we now turn to its various definitions. There are 
various theories of determinism that must be considered as these theories give in different definitions of 
determinism. Therefore, different definitions of determinism are provided in the following lines. 
 
I) William James's definition (simple determinism): "It professes that those parts of the universe already 
laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be" (Earman, 1986: 5). 
II) Laplace's determinism (classical determinism):  "We ought to regard the present state of the universe as 
the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all 
the forces acting in nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, 
would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest 
atoms in the world, provided that its intellect was sufficiently powerful to subject all data to analysis; to it 
nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes.  
The perfection that the human mind has been able to give to astronomy affords but a feeble outline of such 
an intelligence (Laplace, 1820: 4). 
III) Popper's determinism (scientific determinism): Popper introduces a particular type of determinism 
and calls it 'scientific determinism': "The doctrine of  'scientific determinism' is the doctrine that the state of 
any closed physical system at any given future instant of time can be predicted, even from within the system, 
with any specified degree of precision"  (Popper, 1991: 36). 
IV) Causal determinism: Some determinists formulate determinism like this: (a) every event has a 
sufficient cause; (b) at any given time, given the past, only one future is possible; (c) given knowledge of all 
former conditions and all laws of nature, an operator could predict at any given time the subsequent history 
of the universe exactly (Audi, 1999: 228). 
V) Logical determinism: This doctrine supports the view that future events (i.e. changes in the states of 
affairs) are determinate, just like what happened in the past, and that statements about them are 
determinately true or false (Birx, 2009: 299). In the other words; if an accident is going to happen, it is true 
in advance that it will happen (Algra et al., 1999: 519), since it is proven that every statement is true, and if 
it is not so, it is false. This means that no third truth value other than true or false can be attributed to any 
statement. If this is the case, then it might be maintained with regard to statements about the future 
(Borchert, 2006: 5).   
VI) Epistemic determinism: if it is recognized that an accident will happen, then that accident cannot fail to 
occur (Algra et al., 1999: 519). This definition is focused on the external realization or non-realization of the 
event, unlike 'logical determinism' that focuses on what is true or false. 
VII) Metaphysical determinism: the doctrine which supports that all accidents in this world are steady, 
invariable, or predetermined. It does not claim that they are known to everybody or predictable by scientific 
means. Rather, it acknowledges that the future is as little changeable as is the past. Everybody knows what 
we mean when we say that the past cannot be changed. It is exactly the same sense to say that the future 
cannot be changed, according to metaphysical determinism (Popper, 1991: 7). In Popper's opinion, 
"Metaphysical determinism is not clearly testable." (Popper, 1991: 7) However, with the right theology and 
intellectual reasoning we can understand it. 
VIII) Theological determinism: this doctrine argues that God determines all things that happened in the 
past or things that will happen in the Present or future, and the cycle of events that he knows will fall out, 
can fall out. 
According to some theological theories, the concept of God regards the One who is, among other things, 
absolutely good, omniscient, and omnipotent and upon whom, moreover, the entire world and everything in 
it, down to the minutest detail, are absolutely dependent for existence and nature (Borchert, 2006: 8).   
 
4. Kinds of determinism 
 
It is quite clear that, we can draw different divisions in determinism, and thus we can have various types of 
determinism. And it is quite possible that all the previous definitions entail these types. We have a criterion 
in each division that brings about the different types. 
I) Global or local domain: determinism can have many instances. If the desired definition includes all 
instances, we have "global determinism", which refers to the full range. On the other hand, if it includes 
limited instances, we have "local determinism", which indicates limited cases of a given moment of time. 
For example, in Laplace's definition, we face a global determinism (Mu¨ller, Placek, 2018: 215–252). 
II) Complete and incomplete: the state of any closed physical system at any given future instant of time 
can be predicted completely, even from within the system, with any specified degree of precision; as a 
result, this is "complete determinism". And if the time, prediction, or degree of precision is not complete, 
we have "incomplete determinism". Therefore, the forecast will be vague or very probabilistic. 
III) The main factor in the events formation: various factors in the past can be considered as determining 
the future. According to each factor, a special type of determinism might be achieved. 
A) External cause determination: the determination of the effect by the impressive (external) cause. For 
example, (a) If a bullet is fired against a glass, it breaks, and (b) if an electromotive force is applied to the 
ends of a piece of copper, an electric current is set up in the copper in accordance with Ohm's law (Bunge, 
1979: 18). 
B) Targeting determination: determining objects to achieve the desired goals. 
For instance, standardization is pursued in industry in order to lower production expenditures.  
C) Self-determination: determination by the former resultant. For example, the incessant positions of a 
freely moving macroscopic body are uniquely determined by its situation and speed at any prescribed instant 
of time (Bunge, 1979: 18). 
C) Mechanical determination: the determination of the consequent by the precedent, usually with the 
addition of efficient causes and reciprocal functions. For instance, forces change the state of motion of 
bodies (but motion may exist before the application of the forces) (Bunge, 1979: 19). 
D) Statistical determination: the determination of the end result by the joint function of independent or 
quasi-independent entities. For example, in the game of dice, the long-run intermittence of the event 
"throwing two aces in succession" is 1:36 (Bunge, 1979: 19). 
E) Structural (or holistic) determination: the determination of the parts by the whole. For instance, the 
behavior of an odd (a molecule in a liquid, a person in a social group) is determined by the over-all structure 
of the collection to which it belongs (Bunge, 1979: 19). 
F) Dialectical determination: the determination of the total process by the internal "strife" and eventual 
following synthesis of its essential opposite ingredients. For example, the changes of state in matter in bulk 
are constructed by the interaction and final preference of one of the two opposite trends: thermal agitation 
and molecular attraction (Bunge, 1979: 19). 
 
5. Evolution of determinism in physics 
 
In the history of science, various sciences have evolved. In suchlike processes, sometimes many concepts 
and laws are born and at other times many are transformed. Scientists are usually indifferent to these 
developments. But there are times when scientists become sensitive to some concepts. It is even possible for 
scientists to hate some concepts or praise them. If we want to have the right judgment about concepts, it is 
necessary to study the course of developments and their backgrounds (Jammer, 1966: 166). The concept of 
"Determinism" has been hotly discussed throughout the history of physics. The evolution of "Determinism" 
in Physics has had several stages that are examined in the following lines. 
I) The vague causal determinism  
It has been several thousand years since the birth of determinism. First, this concept first appeared in the 
ancient Greek philosophy to interpret nature. From Aristotle's point of view, in what is today referred to as 
the Milesian School, the stance toward the universe was changed from mythical or theological to physical or 
natural (Guthrie, 1962: 43). That is, the members of this school of thought were looking for the "material 
cause". For instance, Thales claimed that the first principle of all things is water. Then water is "Arche" (the 
unity of all things) (Guthrie, 1962: 54). After Thales, Anaximander rejected the opinion that water, or any of 
the popularly (and later philosophically) legalized elemental masses visible in the world today, could have 
served as a base for all the rest. Instead, he located an unnamed substance behind them all, less definite in 
character, which he described as "Apeiron". Therefore, in Anaximander's perspective, the "Apeiron" 
(unlimited) is arche (Guthrie, 1962: 78). Anaximenes supposed 'air' to be the Arche, while Anaxagoras 
taught that 'mind' was the sole originator or establisher of an undifferentiated mélange into the cosmos as we 
know it (Cushing, 1998: 165). 
Early philosophers tried to provide a causal explanation of the universe and to identify the origin of the 
evolution of the universe. But the theoretical apparatus for explaining the movements and events of the 
universe was so crude and vague. Thus, the causal relations and the determinism that governed them were 
very vague and crude. 
II) Atomic determinism (global unique determinism) 
Atomists paid attention to the concept of determinism. From their point of view, especially that of 
Leucippus, " Nothing occurs at random… but everything [happens] for a reason and by necessity" (Guthrie, 
1965: 415). Unlike the early philosophers, Atomists found a clearer cause for the movements and events of 
the universe. In their view, when the atoms move, larger components also have to move, and then objects 
move. According to atomists, atoms are the determinants of all movements, so we can say that they accepted 
the "atomic determinism". Of course, in their theory, the "prediction" of future events was not prominent, 
and they merely provided a justification for the movements. Therefore, they believed in the "incomplete 
determinism". 
III) Theological determinism 
In the middle Ages, Theologians opposed Greco-Arabic determinism, because they thought it would limit 
God (Gilson, 1952: 82). With the development of the Christian theology, God came to be seen as, among 
other things, perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent and upon whom, moreover, the entire world and 
everything in it, down to the minutest detail, are absolutely dependent for existence and nature (Borchert, 
2006: 8). This idea was obviously loaded with feasibility for deterministic theories, and there have been 
many philosophers and theologians who have expanded them into immense systems, some of which have 
formed the basis for theological doctrines having an extremely wide and resistant influence. Thus in the 
middle Ages, the physics for the interpretation of nature encountered a "global theological determinism.” 
IV) Global and complete determinism 
It is known that William of Ockham, an influential fourteenth-century Scholastic philosopher, employed a 
law repeatedly in his work. Today we describe this concept with his famous razor theory," non sunt 
multiplicanda entia praeter necessitated" (existences are not to be propagated beyond necessity) (Cushing, 
1998: 166). Put more succinctly, the basic idea is that the best explanation is the simplest one that works. 
This principle was embraced by scientists of later centuries (Cushing, 1998: 166). The Copernicus 
descriptions, in terms of circular orbits concentric about the sun, were simpler than Ptolemy's at a qualitative 
level. Bacon, in his 'The New Organon', warned people a proper control of tendency of human nature. 
Galileo helped formulate the system of analysis and induction in physics. He supposed the existence of a 
simple, arranged world possessing regularity. Newton, in the Principia, stated what is essentially Ockham's 
razor (used as a criterion of simplicity): "No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both 
true and sufficient to explain their phenomena" (Newton, 2002: 464). And the principle of sufficient reason, 
according to which nothing exists that is unnecessary, was central to the philosophy of Leibniz (Cushing, 
1998: 166). Later, Newton's laws of motion were the beginning of the use of variational principles that are 
common in physics today, although they were not theological statements. 
The ultimate development of "global and complete determinism" was in the 19th century by Laplace. He 
asserted that the state (or the condition) of the universe at any moment of time, future or past, is completely 
determined if its conditions (or situation) is given at some moment, for example, the present. The reason is 
that he believed "If an intelligence, for one given instant, recognizes all the forces with animate nature, and 
the respective positions of the things which compose it, and if that intelligence is also sufficiently vast to 
subject these data to analysis, it will comprehend in one formula the movements of the largest bodies of the 
universe as well as those of the minutest atom: nothing will be uncertain to it, and the future as well as the 
past will be present to its vision" (Laplace, 1820 :3-4). Laplace's determinism is not dependent on God, 
because when the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) questioned him about whether or not he had 
mentioned God in his treatise Celestial Mechanics, Laplace is said to have responded, 'Je n'avais pas besoin 
de cette hypothese-la' (I did not need that hypothesis) (Cushing, 1998: 169).  
Therefore, in the nineteenths century, a complete universal and mechanical determinism appeared which 
was not theological. 
V) Determinism as a dilemma 
The twentieth century was the culmination of developments in the concept of determinism. It is interesting 
to note that there were two different stances toward the concept of determinism. Physicists hated 
determinism, but it was accepted into the social sciences. 
The greatest problems about determinism emerged in modern physics, in particular the quantum mechanics. 
Various physicists have tried to dismiss determinism of physical interpretation and analysis. Studying the 
evolution of physics and philosophy helps us to solve this problem.  
There had been various motives for denying determinism, and studying the evolution of physics and 
philosophy aids us understand how those motivations have emerged. Above all, it seems that the writings of 
Renouvier, Boutroux, Kierkegaard, and Hoffding have been influential in this regard. First, Renouvier 
criticized the strict validity of the causality principle as a regulative determinant of physical processes. He 
denied the belief that causality is a principle without which the experience of an intelligible world would be 
impossible and a realistic principle of order in the cosmos Instead of causality, Renouvier raised a 
phenomenalism according to which all that we immediately know is but a particular phenomenon or 
representation (Jammer, 1966: 174). Boutroux had similar ideas, and denied real and direct knowledge of the 
universe. In fact, he believed that "All experimental finding is reduced, in the end, to confining within as 
close limits as possible the value of the measurable elements of phenomena" and so "we never reach the 
exact points at which the phenomenon really begins and ends" (F. Rothwell, 1920: 28).  
Charles Sanders Peirce took a firmer step and suggested the notion "Nature is not regular" (Peirce, 1935, 
v5: 213) and "Chance is a factor in the universe" (Peirce, 1935, v6: 137). According to him, things and 
events cannot be related to each other. So we cannot predict any incident by knowing its past. The logical 
consequence of his arguments was that in order to properly analyze the process of experimental observation, 
the absolute chance, and not an indeterminacy arising merely from our ignorance, is an irreducible factor in 
physical processes (Peirce, 1935, v6: 156). It is noteworthy that he had commented before Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle. From Exner's point of view, it is impossible to directly and accurately understand the 
particles of the microscopic world because he believed "... Every single, however specialized, physical 
measurement produces only an average value resulting from billions of individual motions... but to predict 
in physics the outcome of an individual process is impossible" (Jammer,1966 :176).  
Physicists insist on differentiating between the probabilities posed by scholars such as Boutroux and Exner 
and the probabilities of classical physics. They also believe that in classical physics, probabilistic 
propositions were the product of the human’s ignorance of the exact details of the individual event, or 
because of the insufficient resolving power of our measuring instruments. While in the new conception of 
probability, it is assumed that macroscopic determinism is a statistical effect and that the individual 
microscopic or submicroscopic event is purely contingent. Ponckare acknowledged this difference in his 
review of the Planck's theory of quanta (Jammer, 1966: 177). With these interpretations, realism is being 
rejected and prediction is rendered to be impossible. 
Charles Gatton Darwin was so much impressed by Poincare and he was one of the first to research for a 
logically consistent formulation of the theoretical foundations of quantum theory.  
All of the above provided the basis for Bohr's theory, which is the so-called "Copenhagen interpretation" of 
quantum physics. However, Niels Bohr's own scientific background should also be explored. His scientific 
growth had a historical origin and philosophical background. 
In his youth time, Bohr was a pupil of Harald Hoffding, who was in turn an ardent student and brilliant 
expounder of Kierkegaard's teachings. Furthermore, Hoffding and Niels' father, Christian Bohr, were not 
only colleagues but also intimate friends. The young Bohr got acquainted with Kierkegaard's thoughts 
through Hoffding lectures. The centerpiece of Kierkegaard's work was philosophy of life and religion, the 
so-called "qualitative dialectic". It seems that his inconsistence between thought and reality, his conflicting 
conceptions of life, and his perseverance on the necessity of choice had apparently left a deep impression on 
Bohr's youthful mind. Kierkegaard insisted on the practical value of thought, opposed the construction of 
systems, and persisted that thought could never attain reality, for as soon as it thinks to do something; it 
falsifies reality by changing it into an imagined reality. 
Based on these teachings of Kierkegaard, reality is either unattainable or there is entirely no absolute reality 
to be sought. However, which person can predict what does not exist? Viewed from the lens of 
Kierkegaard's thoughts, the human cannot – without forgery – conceive of himself as a neutral spectator or 
impersonal observer; he always necessarily remains a contributor. Thus, the human's delimitation between 
the objective and the subjective is always an optional act and his life is a series of decisions. So, the human 
makes truth, and truth and science become the product of human imagination, not because it is the human 
who has creates knowledge, but because the very object of knowledge is far from being a thing ready-made 
from all eternity (Jammer, 1966: 179). Similar to Hoffding and Kierkegaard, Bohr believed that the observer 
effect in observation is indefinite. So, From Bohr's point of view, the human is central to any analysis. 
Therefore, it is impossible to fully distinguish between phenomena and their perception (Gattei, Agassi, 
2016: 34). 
Referring to Kierkegaard's indeterministic theory of "leaps," Hoffding believed "It seems to be clear that if 
the leap occurs between two states or two moments, no eye can possibly observe it, and since it therefore 
can never be a phenomenon, its description ceases to be a description" (Hoffding, 1905: 114). When we do 
not have access to the whole truth, an object cannot be recognized; consequently, "causality cannot be 
described'', either (Jammer, 1966: 180). Kierkegaard's and Hoffding's emphasis on the practical and 
pragmatic significance of truth reverberated in Bohr's frequent remark, "It is not the question at 
present whether this view is true or not, but what arguments we can honestly draw with respect to it from the 
available information" (Rosenfeld, Bohr, 1945: 8). Bohr emphasized, "It is clearly impossible to distinguish 
sharply between the phenomena themselves and their conscious perception" (Bohr, 1958: 27). Likewise, in 
physical research, the traditional distinction between the observer and the object observed has to be desolate 
in atomic physics. 
As it is said, Bohr was also strongly influenced by William James. James' famous sentence "We must find a 
theory that will work" still has use in modern physics (Jammer, 1966: 182). 
The last step in "quantum mechanics" establishment was the development of 'logical positivism' in the 20th 
century. Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicusm" had evoked much discussion in different 
sciences. Its famous concluding statement "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" created an 
unexpected utilization in Heisenberg's new approach to the study of atomic phenomena (Jammer, 1966: 
184). For that reason, many scientists believe that the picture of quantum mechanics that was current and 
familiar did indeed show strongly positivist features (Strauss, 1972: 239). 
Because of these philosophical contexts and physical approaches, physicists eventually denied the 
"mechanical determinism" or "metaphysical causation", and Heisenberg formulated the theory of 
uncertainty. This interpretation became known as the "Copenhagen interpretation", though many opposed 
the Copenhagen interpretation. Einstein and his followers insisted that Bohr's interpretations were false and 
unrealistic. In the EPR article, written in the year 1935, Einstein explicitly dismissed Bohr's theory as 
incomplete (EPR, 1935: 777). 
As a result, lots of fights occurred in modern physics. While these problems have further spread into 
philosophy, theology, and other sciences, causality and determinism have remained a complex dilemma. 
 
6. The characteristics of determinism concept 
 
This concept is made up of various scientific and philosophical presuppositions, and these presuppositions 
are the characteristics of determinism concept. If we are to solve problems and puzzles, we must pay 
attention to these features. If someone thinks carefully about the "characteristics of the determinism 
concept", he might come to notice that these features are the origin of the differences in the suggestions of 
various definitions and the formation of various types of "determinism". 
I) Prediction  
In the determinism discussion, we are not merely looking for the objective relevance of events; rather, we 
are pursuing them from the human perspective or the human mind.  
The Laplace’s demon can predict the future accurately, because it knows everything. The complete and 
accurate determinism happens as a result of the accurate prediction. 
Human beings are naturally curious about the future, and as their various needs enforce them to prepare 
themselves for the possible dangers of the future, they must be able to predict the future. In fact, throughout 
history, the human beings have been trying to replace the obscure laws of the past with the more detailed 
scientific rules so that they can predict the future better and more. Determinism is a tool that by which the 
humans have shown and designated the future. 
II) The world accessibility;  
If there is no access to the world or there were no way that we had been able to understand the world, 
understanding and defining an event in the universe does not make sense, and so, determinism will not exist. 
Even anti-realists like Poincaré was not deny access to the world. (Poincaré, 2015:123) Thus, the world 
accessibility is one of the tenets of determinism. 
III) Connection between the future and the past 
If there is no connection between the past and the future, there will be no determinism. So the "connection 
between the past and the future" is one of the main features of determinism. 
It is quite clear that there is a kind of connection between the future and the past. Therefore, via the 
knowledge of the past, the future can also be known. Now this connection can be a "causal relationship" that 
somehow becomes "necessary" or a "permanent interoperability relationship" (Earman, 1986: 6; Bunge, 
1979: 10; Jammer, 1966: 170), or something similar to Leibniz's "principle of sufficient reason" 
(https://plato.stanford.edu, 2019). Consequently, the "necessary connection" does not have to be essential to 
predict the future. 
 
7. Can determinism be denied completely? 
 The key question about determinism is that can determinism be denied completely? 
From the conceptual analysis we have presented, it can be known that a complete denial of the concept of 
"determinism" in the natural sciences is impossible, because the "characteristics of determinism concept" are 
found in the natural sciences. 
If "the world accessibility " and "anticipation" are denied utterly, it is the science that has been denied, since 
science means "the understanding of the world". If one denies "the connection between the past and the 
future", then he has denied the "prediction". Such a person cannot speak of the "laws" in science either, 
because the basis of the law of nature with its various interpretations has been based on predicting the future 
with the help of the present situation. This prediction cannot be achieved unless a connection between past 
and future is assumed. Although some scientists have denied determinism, we might rely on the previous 
discussions of this article to assert that no one in science can deny determinism completely, because no one 
removes prediction, laws, and the discovery of the world from science. In fact, no scientist would accept 
such a removal (Gattei, Agassi, 2016: 37). 
In addition, the complete denial of determinism eliminates the "will and power of choice" as well as the 
"moral and legal responsibility", since nothing can be chosen with the assumption of unpredictability! 
Therefore, the concept of determinism is assumed in the sciences, but its types need to be known. 
 
8. Types of determinism based on the characteristics of determinism 
 
Given the features of determinism, we can maintain that,  
a) If "prediction" is used to refer to all things, "global determinism" is being taken into account, and if 
prediction is not applied to all things and only has been designed in a specific area, "local determinism" is 
considered.  
b) If accessibility to the facts is complete, then "complete determinism" or "strong determinism" is 
established. On the other hand, if the world accessibility is in a state of uncertainty or probability, then 
"incomplete determinism" is achieved.  
c) If the connection between the past and the future is the causal relationship, then "causal determinism" is 
established. Besides, if the connection between the past and the future is to achieve a goal, then "teleological 
or targeting determinism" is meant (Bunge, 1979: 17). Moreover, if the main factor of the connection 
between past and future is mechanical, then "mechanical determination" is established. 
Other types can be made similarly based on the consideration of other characteristics of determinism. 
 
9. Is it possible to solve the dilemma of determinism in modern Physics? 
 
In the scientific and physical literature, especially in the Copenhagen school of physics, it is claimed that the 
results of quantum physics laws and experiments reject determinism (Gattei, Agassi, 2016: 34) (Hawking, 
Mlodinow,2010: 34). However, it seems that the adherents of this view have "scientifically misunderstood" 
determinism, because the Copenhagen school actually accepts the three characteristics of determinism's 
concept. Even some believe that they have accepted causal relationship (Plotnitsky, 2006: 51-54).  
In fact, the Copenhagen school rejects "universal and complete determinism" or "classical determinism" 
(Mu¨ller, Placek, 2018: 221; Bunge, 1979: 15). The reason is that the adherents of this school realized that: 
(a) observation cannot show the whole of reality, and unlike "classical physics", all observables are not 
obvious; (b) the scope of the universe and its complexities are more expansive than the raw idea of classical 
physics; and (c), instead of going to the components within the collection, it is necessary to investigate the 
collections themselves (Plotnitsky, 2006: 2).  
Therefore, the position of an individual within a population cannot be predicted by the "statistical method". 
Only the chance of one's being in a given situation is possible (Einstein, Infeld, 1967: 298). Consequently, in 
their view, unlike classical physics, it is not possible to explain by one single system all the laws and objects 
of the universe in a few simple mechanical laws. (Bohm, 2005: 43; Audi, 1999: 228). Therefore, some kind 
of "incomplete probability" or statistical probability should be incorporated into the forecast. 
Finally, it turns out that quantum physics has abandoned the "absolute determinism" and considers it 
impossible because, in the view of its scholars, the uncertainty is a fundamental aspect of nature 
(Krane,2012:126-128). Hence, they have come to accept the "incomplete, local, and statistical determinism". 
 
10. Summary and conclusion 
 
As was seen, the concept of determinism was investigated analytically. The terminology of determinism 
with its various definitions and different kinds including, the "global/local domain", "complete/incomplete 
form", and "the main factor in the formation of events" were considered. The evolution of the concept of 
determinism in physics was explained. It was pointed out to this important turning point that determinism 
had changed into a different concept in quantum mechanics. Since Copenhagen school physicists, especially 
Bohr, regarded determinism as a problem and an undesirable element, we designed a new framework to 
analyze the concept of determinism and tried to solve the dilemma of determinism through this 
framework.  As the main conclusion, it is found out that the concept of determinism has features which 
cannot be set aside from the science. More exactly, the final result was that determinism cannot be denied in 
the science; in particular, the quantum mechanics is a deterministic theory but in an incomplete or local 
manner.  
 
References 
 
Keimpe, A., et-al. (1999). The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Audi, R. (1999). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Birx, H. J. (2009). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Time, SAGE. 
 
Bohm, D. (2005). Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, Taylor & Francis. 
 
Bohr, N. (1957). Atom fysik og Menneskelig Erkendelse , Schultz Forlag, Copenhagen; translated into 
English under the title Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (Wiley, 1958). 
 
Borchert, D. M. (2006). Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Second Edition, Vol.3, Thomson Gale, a part of the 
Thomson Corporation. 
 
Bunge, M. A. (1979). Causality and modern science, Dover Publications. 
 
Boutroux, E. (1874). De la Contingencedes Lois de la Nature, Bailliere, Paris; translated into English by 
Rothwell, F. under the title The Contingency of the Laws of Nature, Open Court Publishing Co. 1920). 
 
Butterfield, J. and Earman J. (2007). Handbook of the philosophy of science [2] Philosophy of physics, 
Elsevier. 
 
Carnap, R. (1996).  An introduction to the philosophy of science, London, Dover. 
 
Cushing, J. T. (1998). Philosophical Concepts in Physics (The historical relation between philosophical and 
scientific theories), Cambridge University Press. 
 
Earman, J. (1986). A Primer on Determinism, Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
Einstein, A. and Infeld, L. (1967). Evolution of Physics, The Scientific Book Club. 
Einstein, A., et al. (1935). Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered 
Complete? Physical Review 47, 777.  
 
Gattei, S. and Agassi, J. (2016). Paul K. Feyerabend Physics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gilson, E. (1952). Being and Some Philosophers, Second edition, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
Toronto, Canada. 
 
Guthrie, W. K. C. (1962). A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume I, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Guthrie, W. K. C. (1965). A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume II, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hawking, S. and Mlodinow, L. (2010). The Grand Design, Bantam. 
 
Hoffding, H. (1905). The Problems of Philosophy, translated by G. M. Fisher, Macmillan, New York. 
 
Frolov, I. T. (1984). The Dictionary of Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
 
Jammer, M. (1966). The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill book company. 
 
Jeans, J. W. (1943). Physics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press.  
 
Krane, K. (2012). Modern Physics, Wiley. 
 
Laplace, P. (1820). Essai Philosophique sur les Probabilités; forming the introduction to his Théorie 
Analytique des Probabilités, Paris: V Courcier; repr. F.W. Truscott and F.L. Emory (trans.), A Philosophical 
Essay on Probabilities. (New York: Dover, 1951). 
 
Newton, I., Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System of the World, translation is 
dedicated to D. T. Whiteside (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2002). 
 
Rosenfeld, L. and Bohr, N. (1945). An Essay, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam. 
 
Peirce, C. S. (1868). "Grounds of validity of the laws of logic," Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2, 193-
208; reprinted in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Harvard 
University Press, 1935). 
 
 
Plotnitsky, A. (2006), Reading Bohr: Physics and Philosophy, Springer  .  
 
Poincaré, H. (2015), The Foundations of Science (Translated by George Bruce Halsted), Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Popper, K. R. (1995). The Open Universe (From the Postcript to The Logics of Scientific Discovery), 
Routledge. 
 
Proudfoot, M. and Lacey, A. R. (2010). The Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy, Fourth Edition, Routledge .  
 
Sarkar, S. and Pfeifer, J. (2006). The Philosophy of Science, An Encyclopedia, Routledge. 
 
Strauss, M. (1972). Modern Physics and its Philosophy, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. 
 
Muller, T. and Placek. (2018). Defining Determinism, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69, 
215–252. 
 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal. 
 
https://dictionary.abadis.ir 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
